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ABSTRACT
The prolific use of the internet and electronic mail within the legal profession presents
novel challenges to the application of the attorney-client privilege; especially, in regards to
protecting intended confidential communications relayed through e-mail. This thesis addresses
the question of whether an attorney in Florida, through electronic mail use, can waive his client‘s
right to the protections of the attorney-client privilege. After a review of current case law, law
review articles, statutes, and texts, this thesis concluded that an attorney‘s communication
through e-mail warrants a reasonable expectation of privacy, permitting the attorney to speak in
reasonable confidence to clients through the web. However, attorneys, ethically, should consider
the strong repercussions for using such a potentially transparent medium for communication.
By examining the relationship between current law, the application of the attorney-client
privilege, and a reasonable expectation of privacy, this study provides a comprehensive analysis
for attorneys concerned with electronic mail usage. Lastly, this thesis provides attorneys with
best practices for their electronic mail communications.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
In an instant, digital information can be sent around the world through a complex
infrastructure of networks and computers. Computers share and communicate through a binary
system of one‘s and zero‘s, transmitting data efficiently and quickly. Prior to the development of
the internet and computer programs such as electronic mail, immediate global communication
was restricted to costly international phone calls and overnight packages by airmail. Electronic
mail and the internet have circumvented all traditional notions of how to communicate in a fast
and cost-effective manner.
At the present, e-mail technology has so deeply penetrated our daily routines, we often
fail to remember how we functioned without it. It‘s become a necessity for many. Yet, the
developments in this fertile field for technological growth have only just begun. The increasing
number of electronic mail providers and features adds more users each day. In 1994, it was
estimated that nearly twenty-five million people used the Internet regularly.1 Since then, that
number has grown to nearly 2 billion, or approximately one-third of the world‘s population.2
Each day more people, businesses, and professions rely on the web, and specifically electronic
mail, to transmit information.
The legal profession is one that has been profoundly impacted by the use of electronic
mail. Lawyers often communicate with fellow attorneys, judges, and clients using e-mail
software. Communicating via electronic mail, instead of traditional mediums such as written
letters and telephone conversations, allows attorneys to provide clients with more efficient and

1
2

G. Burgess Allison, At the Edge of the E-Frontier: An Introduction to the Internet, 17 Pa. L. 12, 13 (1995)
See http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm
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affordable legal assistance.3 It also provides significant advantages over traditional mediums
including increased speed, increased storage, reduced cost, and greater access.4 More
importantly, e-mail offers many attractive user features such as near-instantaneous delivery, the
ability to see if messages are opened, and a wide selection of free and subscription-based
software from which to choose. Many readers have an account with some of the popular free email clients such as AOL, Yahoo, and Gmail. ―The practice of law is [furthermore] dependent
upon the rapid transmission of information and documents over geographical space…‖5;
electronic mail is not limited by physical boundaries, allowing messages to be sent and received
from many different locations by the user. There are a myriad of circumstances where
communicating electronically simply outcompetes other forms of communication. For example,
an attorney waiting in a courtroom to be heard by a judge can send and receive e-mails,
addressing client concerns without having to return to the office. There‘s no doubt electronic
mail has revolutionized how attorneys communicate with their clients and others.
However, lawyers have expressed alarm over whether this new mode of communication
is exposed to security or privacy threats. National media agencies have reported scams and
security invasions of private, business, and government e-mail accounts. Usually, the negative
repercussions of such attacks are small-scale, but they send an eerie message to lawyers:
electronic mail may not be as safe as it is perceived to be.

3

William L. Stephens, Jr. Convenience vs. Confidentiality: An Evaluation of the Effects of Computer Technology on
the Attorney-Client Privilege, 35 Duq. L. Rev. 1011, 1012 (1997)
4
Joshua M. Masur, Safety in Numbers: Revisiting the Risks to Client Confidences and Attorney-Client Privilege
Posed by Internet Electronic Mail, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1117, 1130 (1999)
5
Id.
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Figure 1: CNN Article describing the recent data breach at the e-mail marketing firm, Epsilon.6

In particular, the use of e-mail has also raised the question of whether it‘s granted the
same protections as other forms of communication in regards to the attorney-client privilege.
Many attorneys are quick to add a signature line at the bottom of their e-mails which contains a
similar warning as the one stated below:
CAUTION: THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE
INDIVIDUAL OR ENTITY TO WHICH IT IS ADDRESSED AND MAY
CONTAIN INFORMATION THAT IS PRIVILEGED, CONFIDENTIAL, AND
EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE UNDER APPLICABLE LAW. If the reader of
this message is not the intended recipient, or the employee or agent responsible
for delivering the message to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that
any dissemination, distribution, forwarding, or copying of this communication is
strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please
notify the sender immediately by e-mail or telephone, and delete the original
message immediately. Thank you.7
6

See http://money.cnn.com/2011/04/06/technology/epsilon_breach/index.htm
See Yvette J. Liebesman, The Potential Effects of United States v. Councilman on the Confidentiality of AttorneyClient E-Mail Communications, 18 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 893 (2005)
7
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In addition to a disclaimer located at the end of the message, some lawyers will also add a
disclaimer in the subject line of the message, denoting its confidentiality.
The courts have already addressed how security and interception of communications
between certain forms of communication, such as telephone calls, facsimile, and letters, shall be
treated. Courts generally agree there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and confidentiality in
telephone conversations, letters sent through the post office, and in facsimile transmissions. In
contrast, because of the incredible speed at which the internet and electronic mail have
developed, the courts and the legislature have lagged behind in adopting rules and regulations
which specify what protections are granted to e-mail users. The United States Congress did
enact protections of electronic modes of communication in 1986 under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).8 This Act was designed to prohibit ―all wiretapping and
electronic surveillance by persons other than duly authorized law enforcement officials engaged
in the investigation of specified types of major crimes after obtaining a court order.‖ 9 The
expectation of privacy affirmed through the Fourth Amendment was thus expanded by the ECPA
statute to include electronic communications, and therefore affected the attorney-client privilege
when communicating electronically. This statute, arguably, provides a reasonable expectation of
privacy to electronic mail communications, which in turn was later used by state bar review
committees in their evaluations of electronic mail use. 10
Nevertheless, as technology is advancing at a faster pace than the legal community is able
to adapt, the use of e-mail continues to present novel and controversial legal issues. Can these
8

Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510-22 (1986)
Liebesman, supra note 7, at 894
10
Liebesman, supra note 7
9
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unencrypted electronic mail communications between attorneys and their clients result in a
waiver of the attorney-client privilege?
Currently, the American Bar Association (ABA) permits the use of unencrypted e-mail.
In 1999, the ABA issued an official opinion that attorneys may use unencrypted e-mail without
violating the Model Rules of Professional Conduct because the mode of transmission was found
to afford a reasonable expectation of privacy from a technological and legal standpoint.11 ―This
consensus, though, has developed without even one definitive court ruling—indeed, a court has
never considered the issue of whether confidential e-mail communications are protected by the
attorney-client privilege.‖12 The goal of this thesis is to (1) pursue whether the current and
common practice of using electronic mail to communicate with clients regarding confidential and
privileged matters creates a legal waiver of the attorney-client privilege (2), whether the opinion
issued by the American Bar Association is still valid, and (3) whether unencrypted electronic
mail should be used for practical and legal reasons. After a thorough analysis of current law and
practice in regard to e-mail, this thesis will make recommendations for the best practices of
Florida attorneys in their use of electronic mail and the legal ramifications to which attorneys
will be subjected.

CHAPTER TWO: ELECTRONIC MAIL
―You‘ve got mail!‖ has become one of the most ubiquitous phrases in society. So much
so, even a movie in 1998 titled ―You‘ve Got Mail‖ starring Tom Hanks and Meg Ryan was

11

See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99 (1999)
Joseph W. Rand, What would Learned Hand do?: Adapting to Technological Change and Protecting the
Attorney-Client Privilege on the Internet, 66 Brooklyn L. Rev. 361, 363 (2000)
12
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released which recounted a love story that takes place on the internet using e-mail. Electronic
mail has had a lasting impact on interaction and communication. Whereas at one time
Americans would send billions of letters through the postal service, Americans now send billions
of e-mail messages daily, compared to just 293 million pieces of first-class mail.13 As more and
more users go online, society is becoming accustomed to its habits of using e-mail as the
standard means of communicating.
How Electronic Mail Functions
Electronic mail describes the function by which a person sends, and receives, messages,
labeled as ―mail,‖ on a computer. It carries many of the same traits common to postal mail. Like
postal mail, electronic messages need a location to be stored and received by the sender. This is
usually labeled as the ―inbox‖ or ―mailbox‖ for most electronic mail clients. Electronic mail also
requires an address to distinguish where the mail is sent and received. This, conveniently, is
called an ―e-mail address‖ consisting of a combination of text, numbers, and symbols followed
by the ―@,‖ or ―at‖ symbol, which is then followed by a domain name. Lastly, electronic mail
bears semblance to a regular letter in that it contains a return address, subject line, date, and
body.
Conversely, unlike postal mail, electronic mail is able to transmit more information than
simple text. Today, although there are limitations, electronic messages can convey images,
video, audio, and other forms of digital data. Postal mail is also tangible, meaning it can only be
accessed in one physical space. E-mail, however, can be accessed globally through the internet,

13

Michael R. Roberts, Impacts of Email, May 2010.
<http://oak.ucc.nau.edu/mr/cte692/Module_6/impacts_of_email.html>
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at any time and location. This may also be a potential limitation of electronic mail in the fact
that without an internet connection, it cannot be accessed. Overall, despite its differences,
electronic mail is a very comparable type of communication technology.
Two main categories separate how e-mails are sent. The first category describes e-mail
sent through local area networks, ―LAN‖ or ―intranet‖. The second describes e-mails sent using
the internet. Beginning with the first category, ―[a] local area network is a network that is
confined to a relatively small area. It is generally limited to a geographic area such as a writing
lab, school, or building. Rarely are LAN computers more than a mile apart.‖14 LANs were first
used in small law firms to share documents and information. For brevity and focused discussion,
this thesis will not discuss LAN networking in regard to electronic mail. On the other hand, this
thesis will focus on e-mail conveyed through the internet, as it poses a greater likelihood to
compromise confidentiality and security.
In most cases, electronic mail is sent through the internet. Transmission through the
internet utilizes a complex system of networks, routers, servers, and packetization across many
different locations. Joseph Rand describes this process simply:
[Networks forward] the e-mail through a ‗router,‘ a device that analyzes the
transmission, examines the various network points to which it could send the
message next, and sends the message on the most efficient path based on its
understanding of the state of the networks to which it is connected. In this
process, the e-mail might go through up to a dozen separate routers on its way to
its destination server, and it might be stored for a brief time on an immediate
server while the router chooses a path for the next leg of its journey. During this
time, the e-mail might also be broken down into chunks of information, or
‗packets,‘ that might take different routes and get reassembled at the end of the
journey.15
14

See Chapter 1: What is a Network?, Florida Center for Instructional Technology College of Education,
http://fcit.usf.edu/network/chap1/chap1.htm
15
Rand, supra note 12, at 377
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In many ways, these traits of electronic mail are, likewise, characteristic of the internet. Data is
randomly, but efficiently, transferred between multiple routers and servers before arriving at a
destination. ―Anyone intercepting one of the packets en route to its recipient would be unable to
decipher the complete message without the remainder of the packets.‖16

Figure 2: Diagram describing how e-mail travels between computers and networks.17

A useful analogy to this technology is driving. When traveling to a destination, there are
often many different routes from which to choose. Despite some routes varying in duration and
complexity, ultimately the driver will arrive at the predetermined destination and will usually
16

David Hricik, Lawyers Worry Too Much About Transmitting Client Confidences by Internet E-Mail, 11 Geo. J.
Legal Ethics 459, 464-69 (1998)
17
See http://www.oasis-open.org/khelp/kmlm/user_help/html/images/howemailworks.png
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have taken the most efficient route to get there. In contrast, however, to electronic data‘s ability
to packetize, a driver and his vehicle cannot separate into multiple parts, travel concurrent routes
simultaneously, and ultimately reassemble further down the road. This is a trait characteristic of
the internet, known as ―dynamic routing.‖ When an e-mail is sent through the web, it‘s broken
down into different, random packets. It‘s likely that no one part of the message will have
traveled the exact same route to the destination.
Security Risks Associated with Electronic Mail Use
Commentators have referred to e-mail transmission as the electronic equivalent of a
postcard.18 Much like a misdirected postcard, electronic mail that is intentionally intercepted, or
inadvertently sent to the wrong address, can be read by the unintended recipient. Additionally,
like postcards, which can be read at any point in transit to their intended address, electronic mail
transmissions are vulnerable en route to their destination.
Interception of an electronic message, in transit though, is certainly more fiction than
fact. To accomplish the interception of an electronic message, all ―packets‖ of transmitted data
must be captured. This makes the actual transmission of electronic mail very difficult to
intercept. Even if a would-be-criminal attempted to intercept a message sent from an electronic
mail program, he likely wouldn‘t prove to be successful. The few packets that would be
captured would only provide a few words or letters from the original message. Even simply
being able to intercept an e-mail would be a difficult challenge in its own right. A hacker would
have to know the exact location of where the message was departing from, where it was traveling

18

Erik J. Heels, Why Lawyers Should Get on the Internet: Research on and Legal Issues Raised by the Internet, L.
Prac. Mgmt., 25.
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to, and in milliseconds be able to detect what specific journey between networks and routers the
message was going to travel through. Considering the volume of electronic messages sent on a
daily basis, the amount of data sent through any given network, and the minute timeframe, this
may be an impossible task for any hacker to accomplish.
There is contention that this may not be true any longer. Whatever randomness was
originally found in dynamic routing has diminished considerably as internet infrastructure has
developed.19 ―From September to October, 1999, Joshua Masur, at the time a student at
Columbia University, sent six different e-mail messages between his home computer and three
remote computers and found little variety in the paths the messages took through the internet,
much less variety than would be sufficient to provide security.‖20 As the internet continues to
grow and become increasingly standardized, e-mail which may have traveled a random route
―might now take predictable, well-worn, and more easily monitored paths.‖21 Predictable
pathways, nonetheless, are always coupled with other issues like speed of transmission and the
amount of data surrounding the transmission. It‘s unlikely the predictability of a message‘s route
would substantially affect the ability to intercept the message.
A more realistic risk lies in administrative third-party access to e-mail messages. Due to
the lack of many attorneys‘ technological expertise, it‘s a common practice for a network
administrator to have omnipotent access to all computer accounts associated with a law firm.
The administrator is able to make software changes, alter computer privileges, and access saved
documents or information. The same is true for electronic mail accounts. When a technical error

19

Rand, supra note 12.
Masur, supra note 4, at 1147-48
21
Rand, supra note 12, at 389.
20
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occurs, the computer administrator is easily able to access the account and change settings, even
remotely.
E-mails don‘t just travel though – they do eventually stop somewhere. This may be
where the greater security risks are more of a concern. For beginners, most electronic mail
account users are greeted with some sort of log-on screen. This is analogous to a gatekeeper.
Only the individual with the information needed to access the account (usually a username and
password) is able to gain entry. For the average user, this is usually sufficient to keep most
anyone away. Lawyers beware: this is not the highest of security measures. Many people use
simple, one or two word passwords. If we decide to be daring, we‘ll add some numbers, and
maybe a symbol here or there. Overall, our passwords aren‘t too complicated. Unfortunately for
those of us who rely on simple passwords, criminals and hackers are able to exploit our lack of
password security and gain access to our accounts. Consider, too, how often most passwords are
changed. Frequently, users will remain using the same password for extended periods of time.
This increases the vulnerability of the account, as a hacker will have an extended period of time
to decipher the account‘s password protection. Lastly, how many of the same e-mail accounts,
online bank accounts, etc. use the same password? Is the same password for a social media
network being used for banking information?
Chris Roosenraad, a leading computer industry expert in security and information
technology, currently operates as the Director of Systems/Applications at Time Warner Cable,
and the Vice Chair at the Messaging Anti-Abuse Working Group. He‘s formerly worked for a
variety of internet and technology services companies, demonstrating a knowledgeable
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commitment to the industry. Kindly, Mr. Roosenraad offered a wealth of valuable information
concerning the topic of e-mail security in relation to this thesis.
Mr. Roosenraad identified several troubling features of electronic mail. First, he
mentioned that there is a lack of password security for most e-mail users. He finds that the
simplest way, overall, to gain unauthorized access to an electronic mail account ―would be to get
someone‘s password and hack into his mailbox.‖22 While he expressed that the specific
difficulty in doing so varies from situation to situation, he agreed it was very feasible and related
it to a fault, not of technology, but of the ―human being.‖ Later, this concept will be discussed in
more detail. Secondly, he identified a lack of sender verification. When an e-mail is transmitted
to a recipient, there is no mechanism in place to verify the sender‘s identity. This poses a serious
concern, as criminals and hackers are able to ―spoof‖ e-mail identities and pretend to be
someone, or something, they are not. If the recipient decides to reply, he may include private,
confidential, or financial information to the false sender, resulting in clear harm. Finally, Mr.
Roosenraad discussed e-mail messages‘ ability to be intercepted. Though he stressed
intercepting messages is not a trivial task, it is always possible. In practice, however, there are
much simpler ways to acquire information from an e-mail account in comparison to intercepting
data. In his experience, he finds e-mail interception to be a rare occurrence. Interception he
states is ―difficult to do, and if you do something wrong while [intercepting information],
chances are you just knocked something offline.‖23 This, of course, would alert either the sender
or recipient of the message to the presence of some sort of problem.

22

Telephone Interview with Chris Roosenraad, Director of Systems/Applications, Time Warner Cable (Apr. 13,
2011).
23
Id.
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Mr. Roosenraad also addressed questions concerning the relative privacy of e-mail
accounts and messages, as well as what are the best practices for lawyers utilizing electronic mail
technology. When asked whether he, based on his expertise and experience, felt that there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail, he responded ―No.‖ He stated, ―I know enough
about how e-mail works to realize it‘s exposed to a lot of people behind the scenes. Now, most
of those people don‘t care about your message, nor will read it, because they‘re decent people.
The only way to keep that data private is to encrypt it.‖24
Overall, he concluded that the real issue isn‘t necessarily the technology, but the
individual using it. He states that the ―Achilles‘ heal [of technology] is the human being.‖25 A
very effective way to acquire information from a specific user is to socially engineer a method to
do so. Mr. Roosenraad references the industry pseudonym for these attacks, called ―spearphishing‖. These attacks are very specific to one user. He describes why these attacks are so
effective,
It is such a tightly aimed message, that it‘s hard for anti-virus software to figure
out. [The attack] may be completely transparent to the end recipient. It requires a
fair bit of work, though. It‘s not something you‘re going to just do. However, [if]
by seeing some of this information, you can make millions of dollars, then there‘s
a strong incentive for you to do so.26
The recent technological attack on the Dallas-based online marketing firm, Epsilon, was
mentioned as an example of a successful ―spear-phishing‖ attack. By acquiring customer
information, a hacker could spoof his appearance as a legitimate company, directing the recipient
to navigate to a dangerous web-link.

24

Id.
Id.
26
Id.
25
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He does, however, disagree that technology has made the ability to acquire personal
information, illegally, any easier. He states,
It‘s not that technology makes this necessarily any easier; it just makes the
methods of implementation different. What technology may make easier is the
inadvertent ―seeing‖ of the content by someone else. If you seal something inside
an envelope, and then put that envelope inside a FedEx envelope, and then send
that envelope to a law firm, someone has to go through a couple steps to actually
see what the content is. If you just write out an e-mail and hit send, theoretically,
an administrator on either side can read the message. They probably won‘t. They
probably don‘t care. But technically, can they? Sure.27
The ability to inadvertently disclose information, electronically, is becoming increasingly less
difficult.
In conclusion, Mr. Roosenraad explains criminal activity on the internet as a ―chain of
trust.‖ He states, ―The weakest link in the chain is most commonly the human being, at either
end. The technology in between may allow you to do all these sneaky technical things, but it‘s
probably going to be a lot simpler to go after one of the human beings in the equation.‖28 He
shared the following cartoon to visually describe his point:

27
28

Id.
Id.
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Figure 3: Cartoon demonstrating the technological, Achilles' heal. 29

No-Encryption Standard
Encryption is an unfamiliar technology to many. The average computer user, or attorney,
does not often utilize it. It operates by converting text, or other information, into unintelligible
code during transmission.30 The information is then decrypted once it reaches its destination,
becoming intelligible to the recipient. It helps ensure confidentiality, and security, which
standard transmissions cannot.
When e-mail first developed, encryption technology was not a commonly incorporated
feature. During the period of rising e-mail popularity, encryption technology was cumbersome
to use and expensive. ―The two technologies had not developed at the same rate of speed,
resulting in commercial applications of e-mail that far outpaced available encryption methods.‖31
29

See http://www.xkcd.org/538/
Ryan A. Murr, Note, Privacy and Encryption in Cyberspace: First Amendment Challenges to ITAR, EAR, and
Their Successors, 34 San Diego L. Rev. 1401, 1405 (1997)
31
Rand, supra note 12.
30
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During the late 1990s, requiring attorneys to use encryption for attorney-client e-mails might
have been viewed as an unnecessary and burdensome expense.
Today, encryption technology is a standard security measure used by many websites and
online stores. Often, it‘s so simple to utilize, one may have failed to ever notice it. When
traveling to an online banking portal or online store, the normal ―http‖ has been replaced by an
―https.‖ HTTPS stands for ―Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure‖ and provides encryption of
data transmitted to and from the website. When a user connects to a website via HTTPS, the
website encrypts the session with a digital certificate. Digital certificates can be described as,
…essentially a digital document that is issued by a trusted central authority and is
used by the authority to validate a user‘s identity. Central, trusted
authorities…are widely used on the internet to ensure that software from
Microsoft, for example, is really from Microsoft, and not a virus in disguise.32
This approach is effective in preventing nefarious criminals from accessing sensitive information
when it‘s being used to purchase an online product, for example.
Specifically encrypting electronic messages is more challenging, but very feasible. The
additional protection encrypted e-mail messages provide would reasonably end any arguments
regarding the dangers of electronic mail use. Even if a message, or any part or parts, were
intercepted, the contents would be scrambled in unintelligible garble.
Generally, encrypted e-mail uses a lock-and-key approach. Both the sender and the
recipient of a message must have access to the correct encryption key for the message to be
decipherable. A common approach to this method is through the use of a public key. In a public
key approach, there are two numeric program keys used: a private key and a public key. The
sender of the message uses the public key. This key doesn‘t need to be closely guarded. With
32

Windows Server 2008: Unleashed, 402 (2008)
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the public key, the message is encrypted and sent to the recipient. The message can be
intercepted or misdirected, but it is only accessible once it has been decrypted with the private
key. The private key must be closely guarded and distributed in a secure fashion. The recipient
with the private key is the only party that will be able to read the message.33

Figure 4: Diagram showing the public/private key encryption method. 34

Applying this technology to a legal practice, a public key would be made available to a
client. Any messages sent electronically to an attorney would be encrypted with the public key.
The attorney would then decrypt the message with a private key, only available on the attorney‘s
computer. This would ensure the confidentiality of all messages sent by the client and, even if
33
34

Id.
See http://www.networkworld.com/subnets/cisco/chapters/1587052423/graphics/02fig02.jpg
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inadvertent disclosure did occur, would prevent messages from being read by unintended third
parties.35 When the attorney would transmit messages to a client, the use of the keys would
alternate. The attorney would transmit the message, encrypting it with the public key. The client
would receive the message, decrypting the message with the private key. For many reasons,
including cost, lack of knowledge, or technological transition difficulties, the average attorney
and legal practice does not utilize encryption standards in their electronic communications. In
fact, because of the prevalence of older attorneys in today‘s practice, many may be unfamiliar
altogether with the fundamental ideals of message encryption via computerized methods. This
poses a great challenge when trying to make a fundamental shift in safer practices of
communication mediums.
Document Transmission and Attachments
Electronic mail has the ability to transmit documents, in addition to the text of the
original e-mail message. These documents are commonly referred to, and known as, electronic
―attachments.‖ When first developed, attachments were limited to simple text files and small
pictures, those that are often created by document word processors or unsophisticated computer
programs. The amount of data, which could be transmitted, was also restricted. This was due, in
part, to the overall power and speed of computers, as well as the larger networking capabilities
and infrastructure. As computers have gained the ability to process larger quantities of
information, faster, and have acquired speedier connections to the internet, the limit on
attachments has diminished substantially. A user can convey a word processing document as
easily as a reasonably sized video file.
35
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Overall, the use of attachments doesn‘t seem to pose any more or less of a risk, than email messages, standalone, except in regards to metadata (a more comprehensive discussion on
metadata will occur later in this thesis). Attached documents are equally likely to contain
sensitive information an attorney wouldn‘t care to disclose to other parties. Such examples
include drafted motions, memorandums, or case strategies. Accidentally communicating this
information to the wrong parties may result in disastrous consequences, as would a confidential
message to a client. Attorneys should exercise great discretion in what documents are sent by
electronic mail. Unintentionally sending the document, by electronic message, to the wrong
parties may result in severe consequences, both in practice and in legal consequences.

CHAPTER THREE: THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Before a discussion can take place, however, regarding the role of the attorney-client
privilege and its relationship to e-mail, one must first ascertain a foundational understanding of
the attorney-client privilege. The attorney client privilege has roots deep in history. ―Of the now
existing common law privileges, the attorney-client privilege is the oldest.‖36 Historically, the
privilege has been traced as far back as the Romans, where ―attorneys were servants of those
whose affairs they managed and under Roman law, could not testify for or against their masters
since the relationship created a duty of loyalty.‖37 This foundation in Roman law led to the later
development and recognition of the attorney-client privilege throughout history. During the
sovereignty of Queen Elizabeth I, English common law recognized a special relationship
36
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between an attorney and client.‖38 This relationship noted relative confidentiality in
communications between attorney and client, as well as the importance for the client to be able
to speak trustingly and honestly to his lawyer.
The United States Supreme Court formally recognized the attorney-client privilege in
1888.39 Since that time, ―most states have incorporated the attorney-client privilege into their
evidence code and at least twenty state legislatures have codified the privilege.‖40 At the federal
level, the attorney-client privilege has been written into the Federal Rules of Evidence.41 Today,
the common law privilege has been expanded and is generally defined as:
Where legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal advisor in his
capacity as such, the communications relating to that purpose, made in
confidence, by the client, are at his instance permanently protected from
disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, except the protection may be
waived.42
Most jurisdictions‘ codification of the attorney-client privilege by statute43 recognizes the
modern purpose of the privilege. The statutes serve to promote the open conversation and free
exchange of information between an attorney and client.44 This exchange of information allows
attorneys to establish rapport with their clients and build an open environment for case
discussion and resolution. In a secondary and related purpose, these open and honest
communications also allow for counsel to adequately prepare for litigation.45 This enables the
attorney to explore all possible defenses or legal remedies available to the client. In summary,
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courts have repeatedly recognized that the privilege granted to communications between an
attorney and client is of special legal importance and that ―…great care must be taken to ensure
that the attorney-client privilege remains preserved.‖46
A Study of the Attorney-Client Privilege
Clients speak with their attorneys in many fashions. A client may meet with their
attorney in person, communicate with him telephonically, or send messages by fax, mail, or email. The communications consists of both oral and written communications. The law
recognizes that both oral and written communications deserve protection under the attorneyclient privilege.47 Even physical actions, made by the client in order to convey meaning, can
receive these same protections.48 The privilege has broad authority in protecting many different
mediums of communications between an attorney and his client.
Under original common law concepts, the attorney-client privilege protected only those
communications originating from the client and directed to the attorney. Today, communications
between an attorney and client as a whole, as well as communications among paralegals,
employees of the attorney, and experts hired for case preparation, all share the protections of the
privilege.49 The privilege is interpreted in a broad sense. It protects communications made by
individuals acting under the direction of an attorney, unless those communications are
specifically waived.
Florida Statute § 90.502 ―…codifies the attorney client privilege and generally provides
that neither an attorney, nor a client, may be compelled to divulge confidential communications
46
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between a lawyer and client which were made during the rendition of legal services.‖50 This
remains consistent with, and adopts the philosophy of, both the common law and modern
interpretation of the privilege. Furthermore, the attorney-client privilege is an absolute privilege,
meaning that the ―privilege is not subject to any balancing test and cannot be discovered by a
showing of need, undue hardship, or some other competing interest.‖51 However, the ―burden of
establishing that a communication is protected by the attorney-client privilege is upon the party
asserting it.‖52
One important concept relating to the attorney client privilege is that of waiver. ―The
most common waiver of a privilege occurs by voluntary disclosure of the protected
communication.‖53 For example, if a client voluntarily disclosed confidential information to an
acquaintance, and it was later discovered by opposing counsel, or the court, that this disclosure
occurred, the legal protections of the attorney-client privilege for the confidential information
communicated may no longer apply. Waiver of the attorney-client privilege eliminates the
protected nature of the communication between the attorney and client. This voluntary
disclosure can affect the entirety of the communication or ―…any significant part of the matter or
communication.‖54 Simply referring to a particular subject matter of a conversation may also
constitute waiver.
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If the communication, however, is ―…by a client to a person assisting a lawyer in the
rendition of the professional services, [then] no waiver occurs.‖55 This occurs frequently as
attorneys will often have their clients seek out the services and assistance of various experts.
This assistance may occur during trial preparation, or, as part of the information needed to
adequately render a legal opinion. For example, a certified paralegal will often assist a lawyer by
preparing case documents and gathering information from the client. The ‗disclosure‘ of client
and case information to the paralegal would remain within the protections of the attorney-client
privilege.
A waiver of the privilege can also be made in the more traditional sense of the word
―waiver‖. If the client, through written documentation, agrees to allow communications to be
relayed to third parties, the agreement will constitute as a waiver.56 It‘s worth noting that there
are other exceptions, similar to the attorney-client privilege. Some of these include the work
product privilege, husband-wife privilege, accountant-client privilege, etc. This thesis is only
concerned with the concept of waiver in relation to the attorney-client privilege.
An attorney cannot waive the privilege on behalf of his client.57 In Smith v. Armour
Pharmaceutical Co., the defendant‘s attorney inadvertently disclosed a memorandum. Although
the document was widely circulated (and published in several newspapers), the United States
Southern District Court of Florida held that the document and client retained the legal protections
of the attorney-client privilege. The court found that,
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…[T]he contents of the document are no longer confidential is different from
ruling that, in legal terms, the client holding the privilege has lost the privilege
because someone else disclosed the document to the public. In Florida, for a
privileged document to lose that status, it must be found that [the client]
intentionally waived his rights.58
The Smith court also cited Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., in its opinion, quoting
―Although confidentiality can never be restored to a document already disclosed, a court can
repair much of the damage done by [the] disclosure by preventing or restricting the use of the
document at trial.‖59 This once again reaffirmed the legal position that a client retains the right
to disclose, or not disclose, confidential information. It also acknowledged that while
information may be circulated to the client‘s detriment, there are remedies in the courtroom to
help assist the client in retaining whatever legal protections remain.
At the end of the Smith opinion, the court makes one final analogy that is useful in
understanding the Florida courts‘ philosophy in allowing a client to be the only individual to
waive the privilege:
…[W]hat if a confidential memorandum is stolen from an attorney‘s office and
subsequently published in newspapers across the country? Clearly, the client
should not be held to have waived the attorney-client privilege. The fact that the
contents of a privileged document have become widely known is insufficient by
itself to eliminate the privilege that covers the document. Although in practical
terms the document has lost any semblance of confidentiality, the court in legal
terms must recognize that the client has not intentionally waived the privilege.
The law is clear; it is only the client who has the power to waive the attorneyclient privilege. To hold that public circulation eliminates the privilege would, in
effect, give any individual who secured a privileged document the power to waive
the attorney-client privilege by simply having the contents widely recounted in
newspaper reports.60

58

Smith v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co., 838 F. Supp. 1573, 1575 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
60
Smith v. Armour, supra note 58, at 1577
59

24

These cases, as well as the current view of the law, sufficiently demonstrate that the client is the
sole bearer of the rights to the privilege. While documents or conversations may lose any sense
of confidentiality in the public sphere, as in the example of the Smith case, the client still
maintains the legal right to exercise the protections of the attorney-client privilege. The attorney,
or another, cannot waive the client‘s legal rights to the attorney-client privilege, since he is not
the holder of the privilege.
It‘s important to address the expectation of privacy in relation to the attorney-client
privilege and waiver. The general rule is that testimony of a third party who overhears a
confidential communication is admissible.61 However, a client does not waive the protections of
the privilege if, for example, an ―…unknown eavesdropper overhears the communication [which
was] intended to be confidential.‖62 As evidenced in the cases below, the Florida courts have
held that if a reasonable expectation of privacy did not exist, or attorneys and their clients should
have reasonably known an expectation of privacy did not exist in their communications, then the
communication is no longer protected by the privilege.
In Mobley v. State, defendant Autley Mobley argued that the ―…trial court erred in
limiting one of the defense counsel‘s cross examination of a State witness, Charles Bargman.‖63
Mobley was attempting to elicit testimony made during a conversation between Bargman and his
attorney inside a holding cell at the jail. Bargman testified that at the jail, the conversation he
had with his attorney was ―…strictly business and that he intended it to be confidential.‖64
However, ―…he conceded that he knew his conversation could be overheard by another inmate
61

John Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. VIII, s2336 (1961)
The Florida Bar, Evidence in Florida, p. 4-8 (2002)
63
Mobley v. State, 409 So. 2d 1031, 1037-38 (Fla. 1982)
64
Id. at 1038.
62

25

in the holding cell.‖65 The Florida Supreme Court found that Bargman was capable of
preventing his conversations from being overheard by using a private room in the jail. The court
states,
In the absence of any evidence that Bargman was purposely prevented from
conferring with his attorney in private, we find he was capable of preventing
others from overhearing his conversation with his lawyer. His failure to do so
precludes him from asserting the attorney-client privilege. Therefore, the [trial]
court had no basis for limiting appellant‘s sixth amendment right to confront their
accusers.66
The decision in Mobley demonstrates that conversations of a client and attorney must
afford a reasonable expectation of privacy. If, intentionally, conversations occur in an arena
where the expectation of privacy is uncertain or clearly lacking, it will result in a waiver of the
attorney-client privilege. The communication has been conveyed to a third party, thereby
terminating the protections of the privilege.
Departing momentarily from the attorney-client privilege, while remaining within the
realm of privileged communications, the earlier Florida Supreme Court in Proffitt v. State, dealt
with a similar situation. In Proffitt, a third party overheard spoken conversations between a
husband and wife. The court was asked to determine, specifically, whether the appellant, or his
wife, should have known that their privileged communications were being overheard. The court
found that it was readily discernable that the appellant and wife were aware of the third party‘s
presence in their home and were not attempting to keep their voices at a level that could not be
heard by others. The court finds,
There is absolutely no testimony indicating that either the appellant or his wife
made any attempt, no matter how little, to keep the conversation from being
65
66

Id.
Id.

26

overheard. It is further clear from the testimony that conversations were readily
discernible in other rooms and the appellant either knew or should have known
that he was going to be overheard if he was speaking over a whisper. Therefore,
the privileged character of the communication was lost when they were speaking
in a manner and place where they had a reasonable chance of being overheard,
and they knew of that possibility at that time.67
This finding reaffirms the decision of Mobley. In order for a conversation (or communication) to
remain protected by the attorney-client privilege, there must be a reasonable expectation of
privacy within the conversation. Speaking loudly, or in a public location, where a third party
could reasonably overhear the substance of the communications constitutes a voluntary waiver of
the legal protections of the privilege.
These cases present conclusions, which, are of special legal significance in Florida. First,
the client will always be the bearer of the privilege. Attorney error or misconduct may occur in a
case, harming the client, but ultimately the client will be afforded the legal protections of the
attorney-client privilege if he did not voluntarily disclose confidential communications. Second,
the case law establishes the important principle that one must have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his communications in order to be granted attorney-client privilege protection. As
evidenced in the facts above, if one communicates information, where he knows or reasonably
should know his communications are being overheard, those conversations will not be protected.
In relating these findings to the subject of this thesis, the latter poses significant concerns
when studying the attorney-client privilege in relation to electronic mail use. Are electronic
communications private? When information is communicated through the web, does the user
know, or reasonably should he know, that the communication is being ‗overheard‘ by a third
party? How ‗transparent‘ is electronic data sent through an electronic mail account? If in fact,
67
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through further analysis, this thesis finds that there is not a reasonable expectation of privacy in
electronic mail, confidential communications sent by this medium will not be afforded legal
protection under this doctrine. In the next chapter, this thesis will discuss whether a reasonable
expectation of privacy has been explicitly granted to e-mail communications, or if implicitly, a
court could infer a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.

CHAPTER FOUR: EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
Privacy has always been a very highly valued part of the American life and law. The
Constitution of the United States is the primary source to protect the right to privacy. The Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution establishes,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.68
The framers of the Constitution wanted protection from unannounced, unwarranted invasions of
their homes (as they had been subject to during British occupation). Since that time, the Fourth
Amendment has continued to serve as the original and primary source establishing a form of
privacy. Below, this thesis will analyze privacy in the contexts of the federal jurisdiction.
In a modern era, a debate ensued regarding how the Fourth Amendment affected searches
of electronic mediums. The first notable case is Olmstead v. United States. During the National
Prohibition Act, Roy Olmstead was convicted for unlawfully possessing, transporting, and
selling alcohol. Evidence of Olmstead‘s involvement, and the larger conspiracy to sell and
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purchase alcohol, was gathered by four federal prohibition officers. Officers placed wiretaps
along the telephone wires of Olmstead‘s residence and the large office building within which
Olmstead worked. No trespasses were made to the defendant‘s property to place the wiretaps.
Olmstead appealed the decisions of the lower federal courts on the basis that the evidence
obtained by the federal officers was done so in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment described searches ―…of
material things-the person, the house, his papers, or his effects.‖69 It ultimately upheld
Olmstead‘s conviction citing that ―…the language of the [Fourth] amendment cannot be
extended and expanded to include telephone wires, reaching to the whole world from the
defendant‘s house or office. The intervening wires are not part of his house or office, any more
than are the highways along which they are stretched.‖70
The Supreme Court has since overturned the Olmstead doctrine. Though this case did
not find a reasonable expectation of privacy to exist in telephonic communications, other cases
afterwards established a fundamental expectation of privacy when communicating by telephone.
It remains significant for being one of the first decisions to consider this issue.
After the Supreme Court‘s decision in the Olmstead case, Congress enacted the Federal
Communications Act in 1934, forbidding anyone, unless authorized by the sender, to intercept a
telephone message and directed that ―no person‖ shall divulge or publish the message or its
substance to ―any person.‖ It also barred testimony of federal agents concerning the substance of
a defendant‘s interstate communications overheard by agents who had intercepted messages by
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tapping telephone wires. This legislation accepted the importance of recognizing a legal right to
privacy in telephone conversations.
The Supreme Court, in Nardone v. United States, reaffirmed the restrictions created by
Congress. Frank Nardone was indicted for the possession and distribution of alcohol. The
original conviction was based on evidence obtained through telephone wiretapping by federal
agents. In its review, the Supreme Court found that, except when sanctioned by a judge, no
person could intercept a communication and subsequently disclose the contents of that
communication. The Court held that the broad definition of the Act, stating ―no person,‖
prevented even federal agents from wiretapping telephone lines without a court-ordered
subpoena.71 The majority upheld the provisions of the Communications Act of 1934 by
reversing and remanding the conviction of Frank Nardone. Nardone differs greatly from the
decision in the Olmstead case. It affirmed that governments could not access communications to
which they were not privy, establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone
conversations.
In 1942, the Supreme Court encountered the first case involving electronic
communication interception through a medium other than telephone lines. In Goldman v. United
States, federal agents installed a listening apparatus in the wall adjacent to the office of
defendant, Martin Goldman. The listening device was connected to earphones, but failed to
operate correctly. The agents instead used a detectaphone, which when placed against
Goldman‘s wall, could amplify the conversations emanating from inside. A stenographer
recorded the conversations, which were later used as evidence against Goldman. The Supreme
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Court found that the actions of the federal agents were not in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, or the Communications Act of 1934.72 They equated the use of the detectaphone to
the actions of the federal agents in the Olmstead case. Most importantly, however, the Court,
whether intentionally or unintentionally, overruled the rationale of Olmstead on the premise that
conversations could not be seized.
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court issued one of the most important opinions to
develop a right to privacy in electronic communication. Charles Katz was convicted of
transmitting wagering information by telephone from Los Angeles, to Miami and Boston, in
violation of a federal statute. Federal Bureau of Investigation agents were able to obtain the
conversations made by Katz by attaching an electronic listening and recording device to the
outside of the public telephone booth from which he had placed his calls. The lower Court of
Appeals affirmed Katz conviction, rejecting the position that there had been a violation of the
Fourth Amendment, because ―there was no physical entrance into the area occupied by the
petitioner.‖73 The Katz Court disagreed, holding,
We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so
eroded by our subsequent decisions that the 'trespass' doctrine there enunciated
can no longer be regarded as controlling. The Government's activities in
electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy
upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus
constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.74
Katz also established an important two-part test in determining whether a particular
communication merits a reasonable degree of privacy:

72

Goldman v. U.S., 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942)
Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967)
74
Id. at 353
73

31

…first that a person must have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‗reasonable.‘ Thus a man‘s home is, for most purposes, a place
where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to
the ‗plain view‘ of outsiders are not ‗protected‘ because no intention to keep them
to himself had been exhibited. On the other hand, conversations in the open
would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy
under the circumstances would be unreasonable.75
Katz remains as one of the most important cases for determining whether there is an expectation
of privacy in any mode of communication. Its two-part test stands as a measure of reasonable
privacy expectations in the home. It notes two important aspects of privacy: first, there must be
a genuine expectation of privacy by the person asserting it, and second, it must be reasonable by
societal norms. However, the Supreme Court failed to recognize what standard of society would
be applied to this definition. Did it intend to define ―society‖ as those people belonging to an
individual city, state, or nation? Or, did the Court intend to define society as that which is within
the jurisdiction of a court? In regards to electronic mail, this may pose a challenge, as electronic
mail is a means of global communication.
During the same year, the Supreme Court also issued an opinion in Berger v. State of N.Y.
In Berger, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment had been violated when a New
York statute permitted New York State court judges to issue warrants for eavesdropping without
proper judicial oversight. Justice Clark, in the majority opinion, cited Lopez v. United States,
stating ―…the fantastic advances in the field of electronic communication constitute a great
danger to the privacy of the individual; indiscriminate use of such devices in law enforcement
raises grave constitutional questions under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.‖76 The Berger
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decision placed special emphasis on the potential for abuse of electronic surveillance equipment
to overhear private conversations. The Justices also pointedly disagreed with law enforcement‘s
claim that the ability to fight crime would be hindered by forbidding the use of eavesdropping
equipment without probable cause. The Berger Court writes:
…it is not asking too much that officers be required to comply with the basic
command of the Fourth Amendment before the innermost secrets of one‘s home
or office are invaded. Few threats to liberty exist which are greater than that
posed by the use of eavesdropping devices. Some may claim that without the use
of such devices crime detection in certain areas may suffer some delays since
eavesdropping is quicker, easier, and more certain. However, techniques and
practices may well be developed that will operate just as speedily and certainly
and-what is more important-without attending illegality.77
The Court granted further protections to conversations and expanded the right to privacy once
more.
In The People v. Gregory Diaz, the Supreme Court of California, on January 3rd, 2011,
issued a divisive opinion regarding whether the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution permits law enforcement officers to conduct a warrantless search of a defendant‘s
cell phone‘s text message folder, incident to a lawful arrest. Defendant, and appellant, Gregory
Diaz, was involved in a controlled purchase of Ecstasy. A police informant, wired to transmit
the defendant‘s conversations, purchased Ecstasy from a seller in the backseat of the defendant‘s
vehicle. Shortly thereafter, the defendant was stopped and arrested for being a coconspirator in
the sale of controlled substances. Ecstasy, marijuana, and a cell phone were seized from the
defendant‘s person. The defendant was transferred to a police station.
There, Mr. Diaz was questioned regarding the drug transaction, in which he denied
having any knowledge. After the interview, the arresting officer looked at the defendant‘s cell
77
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phone‘s text message folder and discovered a message, which, according to the officer‘s training
and experience, described the sale of Ecstasy. The police officer confronted the defendant
regarding the message, thereafter prompting the defendant to admit his involvement in the sale.
The defendant asserted to the California Supreme Court, that although law enforcement is
legally permitted to conduct an immediate search of a person following an arrest (as is found in
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973),
and United States v. Edwards 415 U.S. 800 (1974)), the ―character‖ of a cell phone is not the
equivalent of items traditionally seized by officers. The defendant argued that cell phones
―contain quantities of personal data unrivaled by any conventional item of evidence traditionally
considered to be ‗immediately associated with the person of the arrestee,‘ such as an article of
clothing, a wallet, or a crumpled cigarette box found in an arrestee‘s pocket,‖ and, therefore,
implicate heightened ―privacy concerns.‖78
The majority of the Diaz court rejected the defendant‘s view that the validity of a
warrantless search depends on the character of the searched item. The California Supreme Court
cites United States v. Ross, stating,
[A] constitutional distinction between ‗worthy‘ and ‗unworthy‘ containers would
be improper. Even though such a distinction perhaps could evolve in a series of
cases in which paper bags, locked trunks, lunch buckets, and orange crates were
placed on one side of the line or the other, the central purpose of the Fourth
Amendment forecloses such a distinction.79
The court also agreed with the decision in New York v. Belton, finding that whether or not a
container can be searched does not depend on the arrestee‘s reasonable expectation of privacy in
that container.
78
79

The People v. Diaz, 51 Cal.4th 84, 94 (Cal. 2011)
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982)

34

[A]ny container…[in] the passenger compartment…may…be searched whether it
is open or closed, since the justification for the search is not that the arrestee has
no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the
infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have.80
Lastly, the court found the defendant‘s argument unpersuasive that a cell phone‘s ability to store
large amounts of personal data should be determinative. The court writes, ―Even ‗small spatial
containers‘ that hold less information than cell phones may contain highly personal, intimate,
and private information, such as photographs, letters, or diaries.‖81
The December 2010 decision of the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States v. Warshak now serves as the most important case affecting electronic mail and
privacy. In 2001, Steven Warshak owned a number of companies selling herbal supplements.
One of those was a company that sold herbal supplements targeted at ‗male enhancement‘.
During several years of sales, Warshak and his employees engaged in questionable financial
tactics, often fraudulently reporting credit card sales and customer information. In conjunction
with a criminal investigation, the government seized roughly 27,000 private e-mails from
Warshak‘s Internet Service Provider. From a culmination of evidence, including the e-mails
acquired from law enforcement, Warshak was sentenced to prison and ordered to pay substantial
fines.
Warshak appealed the conviction, arguing that the government did not have a warrant to
acquire his private, e-mail messages. He argues that the government‘s warrantless seizure of his
private e-mails is a violation of the Fourth Amendment‘s prohibition on unreasonable searches
and seizures. In its review of decisions like Katz and Smith, the Court of Appeals found that e-
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mail accounts are afforded a reasonable expectation of privacy, analogous to those expectations
found when communicating by telephone or through postal mail. The court writes,
Given the fundamental similarities between e-mail and traditional forms of
communication, it would defy common sense to afford e-mails lesser Fourth
Amendment protection…As we have discussed above, the police may not storm
the post office and intercept a letter, and they are likewise forbidden from using
the phone system to make a clandestine recording of a telephone call-unless they
get a warrant, that is. It only stands to reason that, if government agents compel
an ISP [Internet Service Provider] to surrender the contents of a subscriber‘s emails, those agents have thereby conducted a Fourth Amendment search, which
necessitates compliance with the warrant requirement absent some exception.82
In summary, the Warshak case is the first to directly address whether an expectation of
privacy exists in electronic mail communications. It sufficiently establishes a reasonable
expectation of privacy in e-mail activity.
In summary, the cases presented here are binding on the federal judiciary, while some are
further limited to an individual circuit (as evidenced by Warshak). Because this thesis is focused
specifically on Florida courts, it‘s important to reaffirm that these federal cases are for reference,
and persuasive, uses only. Florida courts will retain their discretion to adopt, or reject, the legal
principles of the federal judiciary.
Whether an expectation of privacy is present plays a crucial role in determining whether
the attorney-client privilege exists. ―The privilege only extends to communications intended to
remain confidential that are made under circumstances where a reasonable expectation of privacy
exists.‖83 If Florida judges adopted the two-part test, as described in Katz, or adopted the
finding in the Warshak case, it is likely that a reasonable expectation of privacy would be
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afforded to electronic mail communications between attorneys and their clients. This would
permit attorneys to communicate electronically more comfortably, with less concern for the legal
repercussions doing so.

CHAPTER FIVE: INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE
Courts drastically differ on their opinions and rationale regarding inadvertent disclosure
of documents or information. In today‘s world of complex litigation and exchange of
information cross-nationally or internationally, considerations by lawyers should be made with
respect to how other jurisdictions view an attorney‘s request to keep inadvertently disclosed
documents confidential. In many cases, lawyers will deal with clients and/or opposing counsel
across state lines. Jurisdictions widely vary in their legal approach. This thesis has identified
three main approaches: automatic waiver of the attorney-client privilege, whether the client
intended to waive the attorney-client privilege, and a balancing test approach.
Automatic Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege
Some jurisdictions adopt the principle that one cannot un-ring a bell. This theory is
rooted in the belief that if a confidential document is produced, even inadvertently, to another
party outside of the intended communication, the veil of confidentiality is removed and the
document is no longer confidential.
In Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Singh, 140 F.R.D. 252 (D. Me. 1992), the
United States District Court in Maine considered the inadvertent disclosure of a document sent
by facsimile. The case facts describe a secretary, who in preparation for discovery removed all
copies of a memorandum that was not to be submitted to opposing counsel. Accidentally,
37

however, the secretary faxed a copy of this privileged memorandum to opposing counsel when
submitting other documents by facsimile. The plaintiff‘s attorney objected to its use in trial, on
the legal grounds that the document was protected by the attorney-client privilege and work
product immunity.
To the plaintiff‘s detriment, the District Court disagreed. The court held, and adopted the
belief, that inadvertent disclosure does constitute a waiver because the privilege applies only to
confidential communications. After disclosure, the information cannot be deemed confidential,
regardless of the party‘s intentions. Citing the case, Chief Judge Gene Carter writes, ―Once
persons not within the ambit of the confidential relationship have knowledge of the
communication, that knowledge cannot be undone. One cannot ―un-ring‖ a bell.‖84 Despite the
plaintiff producing the document inadvertently to opposing counsel, the attorney-client privilege
was waived when opposing counsel reviewed it.
In a similar approach, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held in
Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1970), that a
letter, inadvertently disclosed, did not maintain attorney-client protections. In this case, a letter
was inadvertently sent between the parties, which described patent solicitation services
performed by the plaintiff‘s attorney. During deposition, the attorney, furthermore, refused to
answer questions pertaining to the letter, arguing the document was subject to the protections of
the attorney-client privilege. The court took a hardline approach to the argument. It found that it
would not consider the intentions of the party producing the document as a test for
confidentiality. It also did not attribute the inadvertent disclosure as chargeable to the client. In
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a strict view of the attorney-client privilege, the court writes, ―Once the document was produced
for inspection, it entered the public domain. Its confidentiality was breached thereby destroying
the basis for the continued existence of the privilege.‖85 In this holding, it seems that any
document or confidential material, if disclosed by a party intending to keep the information
confidential, is subject to review if inadvertent disclosure occurs. This stern approach may be
severely damaging to clients and attorneys, alike.
Again, a United States District Court, this time in Oklahoma, was faced with the question
of whether inadvertent disclosure of documents abrogated the right of confidentiality under the
attorney-client privilege. In W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 771 (W.D. Okla.
1976), an attorney inadvertently provided documents to opposing counsel during the production
of documents. Despite the court ordering that many of the documents weren‘t subject to the
protections of the attorney-client privilege, they found that the act of the defendant voluntarily
producing documents to opposing counsel was sufficient to waive the privilege, regardless.86
Under this theory, lawyers and clients have few options in regard to the confidentiality of
documents, which are produced inadvertently. These jurisdictions agree: the protection and
confidentiality of a document is irrevocably breached upon its disclosure. In this bright-line
approach to the confidentiality of documents, attorneys will be unable to convince a court to
limit the use of documents that are produced accidentally. Applying this approach to modern
habits of attorneys, it‘s very possible that a misplaced e-mail, disclosing litigation strategies or
confidential documents, would enter the public domain for review.
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Client‘s Intent – Waiver of the Attorney Client Privilege
In contrast to the view of the jurisdictions above, some jurisdictions are not as strict when
inadvertent disclosure occurs. Instead of a strict approach, whereby if disclosure occurs at all a
document enters the public domain, some courts reason that inadvertent disclosure by an
attorney, or his employees, does not necessarily warrant an automatic disregard for the attorneyclient privilege. These jurisdictions find that the attorney-client privilege rests not with the
attorney, but with the client. In this analysis, accidental disclosure by the attorney does not
waive the client‘s right to the protections of the privilege.
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, in Trilogy Communications, Inc. v.
Excom Realty, Inc., 279 N.J. Super. 442 (Law Div. 1994), reviewed the inadvertent disclosure of
a memorandum. The memo was purported to be confidential and was prepared for submission to
Trilogy Communications, Inc. Prior to its submission, however, it was to be sent for review to a
member of the defendant‘s general counsel. Before review of the document occurred, it was
inadvertently sent, unsigned, to the plaintiff, Trilogy Communications, Inc. along with 5,500
other documents during a discovery request. Excom Reality, Inc. objected to its use in trial,
claiming the document was confidential and intended to remain confidential under the attorneyclient privilege.
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, held that the inadvertent disclosure of
the document did not constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. It rejected the old view
of Wigmore on Evidence, which aligns with the view of the jurisdictions mentioned in the prior
section, that the privilege is destroyed by any involuntary disclosure, including a mistaken one.87
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Basing its decision in a more modern context, the court held that for important public policy
reasons, and based on the legal principle that waiver imports the intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right88, that the party charged with the waiver must have deliberately
intended to relinquish it. Therefore, disclosure, which is accidental or inadvertent, does not
necessarily permit the disclosure to be used by the opposing party for review, or at trial.
Other cases have similarly placed emphasis on the client‘s intent to waive his right to the
attorney-client privilege and the confidentiality of documents. In a similar finding, the United
States District Court, of the Northern District of Illinois, in Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co.,
531 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Ill. 1982) held ―…if we are serious about the attorney-client privilege
and its relation to the client‘s welfare, we should require more than such negligence by counsel
before the client can be deemed to have given up the privilege.‖89 As the Trilogy case did, it too
rejected the old, Wigmore strict responsibility doctrine, which would automatically allow for a
document‘s review despite unintended disclosure.
While these cases emphasize the ‗innocent client‘ and provide greater client protections,
despite attorney negligence, disclosure can still have tremendously devastating effects. If, for
example, a document submitted to an opposing party contained negotiation or litigation
strategies, the consequences may be insurmountable. Yet, whereas the first grouping of cases
did not provide any legal remedy for attorneys faced with inadvertently disclosed documents,
these jurisdictions recognize a legal remedy for such accidental disclosure.
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A Balancing Test
The third analysis commonly used by court systems is that of a balancing test. The courts
weigh whether the inadvertent disclosure of a document, or information, will suffice as a valid
waiver of the privilege based on the circumstances surrounding the disclosure. In this view,
some jurisdictions have established tests to determine the effect of inadvertent disclosure on
waivers.
The case of Suburban Sew ‘N Sweep Inc. v. Swiss Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254 (N.D. Ill.
1981), is a good example of the some courts‘ ability to weigh many factors in determining the
effect of inadvertent disclosure on waiver. In this case, the plaintiffs suspected that the
defendant was engaging in unlawful price discrimination and conspiring to restrain trade in
violation of the Clayton Act and Sherman Antitrust Act. Attempting to substantiate their claims
against the defendant, the plaintiffs began the practice of searching through the dumpster located
behind the defendant‘s office complex. For nearly two years, this practice continued and
resulted in the plaintiffs acquiring several hundred relevant documents. The documents were
mostly handwritten drafts of memorandums sent to the defendant‘s corporate counsel.
During the course of the trial, the defendant‘s document disposal process was elicited.
Initially, an employee of Swiss Bernina, Inc. would compose a handwritten draft of a
confidential letter. Upon the mailing of the letter, the draft was disposed of in a wastebasket
inside of the office. Later, an employee would empty the wastebasket into a dumpster located
behind the Swiss Bernina, Inc. office building. The dumpster was owned solely by Swiss
Bernina, Inc. and a company contracted with the defendant would empty its contents on a regular
basis.
42

At trial, both parties agreed that defendants expected these documents to remain
confidential. However, the magistrate in the court of original jurisdiction disagreed with the
plaintiff‘s practice of taking documents from the defendant‘s privately owned dumpster, and
prevented their admission into evidence.
On appeal, the United States District Court, for the Northern District of Illinois, weighed
several factors in its determination of whether these practices constituted a waiver of the
attorney-client privilege. The court cited the ―modern trend,‖ moving away from the strict
standards of Wigmore‘s principle that inadvertent disclosure equals automatic waiver. However,
in evaluating the arguments of both the plaintiff and defendant, the court analyzed the
defendant‘s document retention strategies. It recognized that the defendant did not put the
documents in a place for safekeeping and did not diligently attempt to safeguard their
confidentiality. It focused on two considerations in its holding: ―(1) the effect on uninhibited
consultation between attorney and client [by] not allowing the privilege in these circumstances;
and (2) the ability of the parties to the communication to protect against these disclosures.‖ 90 In
response to the first consideration, the District Court found that the likelihood of a party to risk
the potential civil and criminal implications of rummaging through mounds of garbage, in the
hopes of finding confidential information, does not sufficiently deter open and honest
communication between attorneys and clients. For the second consideration, the court held that,
―while requiring this degree of precaution may seem extreme, if the parties feel that the
likelihood of disclosure is sufficiently great, the precautions may be justified, and it is within
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their power to decide what precautions to take, and so to protect against disclosure.‖91 With this
ruling, the court applied a balancing test to weigh the interests of both the plaintiff and
defendant. Finding in favor of the plaintiff, the court‘s reasoning established that though there
were several considerations which were paramount to its justifications, the defendant ultimately
carried the reasonable responsibility to ensure that confidential documents were protected in such
a way to prevent their disclosure.
The United States District Court, for the Northern District of New York, in Lois
Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) was presented a
similar challenge: which interest would prevail in a case of inadvertent disclosure? The facts
presented to the court described Lois Sportswear‘s requests for the production of documents by
Levi Strauss & Co. Its request resulted in over thirty thousand documents produced by Levi
Strauss. Inadvertently, in the large request for documents, the defendant produced twenty-two
documents, which, it alleged, were protected by the work product doctrine and the attorney-client
privilege.
Reviewing the case facts, the court determined that there were several factors that would
assist it in resolving the issue of whether or not the release of the documents was a knowing
waiver, or a simple mistake, later recognized and rectified.92 The court cites the following
elements as critical in its review of this issue: ―…reasonableness of the precautions to prevent
inadvertent disclosure, the time taken to rectify the error, the scope of the discovery[,]…the
extent of the disclosure[,]…fairness and the protection of an appropriate privilege…‖93
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The court relied heavily on the intent of Levi Strauss, rejecting too the Wigmore ―strict
responsibility‖ doctrine and analyzing more closely the intent of a disclosure. It found that
although Levi Strauss had not adopted a regular practice of deeming documents confidential at
the time of their origination, and that it did not have a thorough method to protect these
documents, the intent of Levi Strauss to prevent these documents from being disclosed was
sufficient to prevent their admission in trial. It ultimately upheld Levi Strauss‘ pre-trial motion
to prevent the admission of the twenty-two documents into the record. This case further serves
as an example that some courts are apt to view many factors in the consideration of whether
inadvertent disclosure is admissible at trial and whether that disclosure is considered a known or
unknown mistake.
Very similar to the case above, in In re Grand Jury Investigation, 142 F.R.D. 276
(M.D.N.C. 1992), a company was served with three grand jury subpoenas duces tecum. During
the production of documents, in accordance with the subpoenas, the company produced over
three-hundred thousand documents for the jury‘s review. The company inadvertently disclosed
eighteen documents, which were protected by the attorney-client privilege. It sought a protective
order from the United States District Court, for the Middle District of North Carolina, to prevent
the documents‘ disclosure to the jury, alleging the documents were protected by the attorneyclient privilege.
Evidence demonstrated the company had a reasonable method to determine a document‘s
responsiveness to the requirements set forth in the subpoenas. The court notes, ―Responsive
documents [to the subpoena] were further reviewed by a team member, in the presence of the
senior team attorney (who has ‗seven years experience in conducting large document productions
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efforts‘), to determine if they were privileged.‖94 Documents, which were thought to be
privileged, were referred to the senior attorney for final review. If a document was found to
warrant attorney-client privilege protections, a red slip of paper was stapled to the document,
designating it to be withheld from the document production. Finally, the documents, which were
to be produced to the government, were organized according to the subpoenas, and all privileged
documents were removed.
The District Court applied the balancing test in determining whether the attorney-client
privilege had been waived by inadvertent disclosure. It applied a five-factor test in its
determination. The court writes,
…the test calls for the court to consider the following factors: (1) the
reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure in view
of the extent of the document productions; (2) the number of inadvertent
disclosures; (3) the extent of the disclosure; (4) any delay and measures taken to
rectify the disclosure; and (5) whether the overriding interests of justice would or
would not be served by relieving a party of its error.95
The court purposefully failed to adopt one consistent method for reviewing inadvertent
disclosure cases. Instead, it notes that each will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. In its
opinion, it finds that waivers do usually have to be intentional or knowing acts.96 In conclusion,
based on its review of the factors, the court found that the company had reasonable and adequate
precautions in place to prevent the disclosure of protected documents. The company did not
intend to release the specific, privileged documents to the government. Therefore, the
documents would not be admitted for the jury‘s review.
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Florida Cases Regarding Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents
Generally, it appears Florida courts have adopted a ―balancing test‖ approach in their
determination of whether or not the inadvertent disclosure of information constitutes a waiver of
the attorney-client privilege for protected documents. As will be described in more detail below,
Florida Courts have looked to five criteria to determine whether inadvertent disclosure of
privileged material constitutes a waiver of the privilege: (1) the reasonableness of the precautions
taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure, (2) the number of inadvertent disclosures, (3) the extent
of the disclosure, (4) the delay in measures taken to rectify the inadvertent disclosures, and (5)
whether overriding interests of justice will be served by relieving the party of its error.
The Florida Supreme Court officially recognized the ―relevant circumstances‖ test to
determine if inadvertent disclosures would result in waiver in Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So.
2d 326 (Fla. 2007). In the Lightbourne case, the State inadvertently disclosed a memorandum to
the defense. The Court analyzed the five-factor test, eventually finding the State had failed to
take reasonable precautions to prevent inadvertent disclosure of the document, in violation of the
first part of the five-factor test.97
In Nova Southeastern University, Inc. v. Jacobson, 25 So.3d 82, (Fla. 4th DCA 2009),
Nova Southeastern University sought review by the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeals in
light of a denied motion for protective order. The facts describe the defendant, while working at
a middle school, receiving a facsimile transmission, which contained a letter from the law firm
representing Nova Southeastern University (NOVA). Earlier, Patricia Jacobson had been fired
from the University for ―…failure to comply with an earlier written final warning and for
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negligence and inefficiency, as well as other grounds.‖98 Jacobson alleged that she had been
terminated based on a disability and the University, therefore, took a course of conduct in order
to justify her termination.
The letter sent in the facsimile transmission was authored by counsel for NOVA and was
addressed to the head master of the school, the human resources department, and the director of
the middle school. It described Jacobson and the termination stating that the university ―…did
not have enough performance issues to fire [Jacobson], and that it would have to be a business
decision whether [Jacobson] was going to remain an employee of NSU.‖99 At a deposition, the
counsel for NOVA objected to the admission of testimony regarding the letter and claimed it was
protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Counsel for NOVA highlighted their intentions to keep the letter confidential. The coversheet on the facsimile transmission stated that the letter was protected by the attorney-client
privilege. Furthermore, NOVA filed affidavits from each of the parties to whom the letter was
sent, indicating they didn‘t intend for third parties to see the communication.
The court weighed the five factors in determining whether the attorney-client privilege
had been waived. It had the most difficulty in reaching a conclusion of whether reasonable
precautions were taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure. In remanding the case to the trial
court, the appellate court asked the judge to focus narrowly on several issues: ―…whether the
client knew or should have known that the letter sent by the attorney would be viewed by third
parties. Whether the use of the fax machine to send the communication negates a claim that the
matter was sent in confidence requires a fact-intensive determination.‖ While a determination
98
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was not made as to this issue, the court acknowledged and relied on use of circumstantial factors
in reviewing how the disclosure did or did not affect the retention of the privilege.
At the District Court of Appeals, Third District, in Abamar Housing and Development,
Inc. v. Lisa Daly Lady Décor, Inc., 698 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), the court was petitioned
to quash a trial court order denying the plaintiff‘s motion for the return of specific documents,
which were allegedly protected by the attorney-client privilege. The documents were
inadvertently disclosed during a large document production. The plaintiffs had taken reasonable
precautions to ensure that privileged documents were not released to the defense. Despite the
production of approximately one hundred thousand documents, a lawyer and paralegal were
assigned the arduous task of reviewing all the documents to be produced. Accidentally, twentythree documents were produced which should have remained confidential.
In its analysis of the appeal, the Florida Third District Court of Appeals took the same
five-factor test to determine whether the disclosure waived the attorney-client privilege. Based
on the overall circumstances of the case, the defendant was ordered to return the documents and
was not permitted to use the documents or reference them at trial.
Strikingly relevant to this thesis, the case of Minakan v. Husted, 27 So. 3d 695 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2010) dealt directly with the access of e-mail messages and inadvertent disclosure. During
a dissolution of marriage proceeding, the husband motioned for the disqualification of his former
wife‘s attorney. The husband alleged that prior to the dissolution proceeding, the couple shared
an e-mail account, where the password and access were jointly shared. However, shortly after
the proceeding for dissolution began, the husband claimed he changed the password to the
account to prevent access by his former wife. The wife was still able to access the e-mail
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account after this password change, stating that she used the same password to login as she had
always used.
During the time in which the wife continued to access the account, she became privy to
messages between the husband and his attorney. In her review of the messages, she discovered a
message that had been sent by the husband to his attorney. The wife interpreted this e-mail as
evidence to defraud her in the dissolution proceeding. Quickly, she forwarded the message to
her sister, which was later sent to the wife‘s attorney. Immediately, the wife‘s attorney
recognized that the e-mail would potentially be subject to attorney-client privileges and sent the
husband‘s counsel a letter returning the electronic message.
The case facts are truly unique, representing the only Florida appellate case found
discussing the attorney-client privilege and misuse, or unintended disclosures, of electronic
messages. Unfortunately for purposes of this research, the appellate court failed to make a
finding as to the confidentiality of the e-mail message that was acquired by the wife and whether
the husband acted in a manner, which demonstrates his intention to keep the document
confidential. The court did, though, specify that the trial court was not to apply the five-factor
test of inadvertent disclosure, as neither party alleged the disclosure was inadvertent.100

CHAPTER SIX: ANALOGIES TO OTHER MEDIA
Throughout more recent modern history, technology has swiftly changed for many
professionals. Implementation of new devices, like fax machines and cordless telephones,
brought with it a certain group of legal professionals that were fearful of the possible
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implications and dangers of using the new technology. Despite these fears, however, attorneys
have consistently relied on these new forms of technology to communicate with their clients.
Fax machines, cordless phones, and computers are mostly commonplace to all offices.
With each new office technology, concerns of privacy were adverted. In analyzing
electronic mail and the new, similar concerns that are present currently, it‘s practical to report
what the legal community‘s reaction to other technology has been. Below, this thesis will
analyze other communication devices and their respective relationship to privacy concerns of
electronic mail.
Facsimile
Fax machines were one of the first technological advancements to allow for the sending
and receiving of physical documents over geographic space, without the use of hand delivery or
postal service. The technology utilized existing phone lines to transmit data.
For many reasons, fax machines were quickly adopted. Similar to the improvements
electronic mail has brought to the legal profession, fax machines offered many of the same
attractive benefits. Documents could be sent quickly, cheaply, and almost instantly.
Fax machines are similar to electronic mail transmission in several respects. Like e-mail,
fax machines are not restricted by geographic space. They transmit documents rapidly across
large distances. Additionally, each fax machine has its own address: a telephone number. This
is comparable to an e-mail address. It‘s a unique identifier, which allows the technology to
appropriately convey information to the correct fax machine.
Dissimilarly, fax machines are generally not restricted to one user. Unlike an e-mail
account, which can only be accessed by an individual username and password, fax machines
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generally are purchased for whole office use. If a confidential document was sent by fax, one
could not necessarily guarantee that only the claimed recipient of the document would have
access to the information. This is a trend that is becoming decreasing true, however, as the cost
of fax machines has decreased dramatically as the technology has been integrated into personal
printers, computers, etc. Also, the increased use of electronic mail, where documents can be
scanned and sent electronically, has decreased fax machine usage.
Facsimile transmission ―…became affordable and widely used in the 1980‘s…‖101 and
was at once under scrutiny for its effect on the attorney client privilege. Many courts faced with
the issue agreed that a fax did not alter the nature of the privilege or the protections that it
granted.102 Lawyers were still cautioned to maintain client confidentiality when faxing materials
as ―careless use of a fax machine may result in inadvertent delivery of client information to the
wrong person, triggering a dispute over availability of the attorney-client privilege and possible
malpractice liability.‖103
Cordless Telephones
Cordless telephones operate by broadcasting radio waves in all directions. A cordless
telephone communicates with a base station on a radio frequency. Both the incoming and
outgoing conversations are relayed through this base station from the headset. The
communications then transmit through the telephone lines to the party on the other end.
Because the conversation is openly broadcast, the radio waves aren‘t secure. Similar to a
radio station, which you would tune into with a stereo, a cordless telephone conversation could
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be intercepted intentionally, or by mistake, with relative ease. 104 All that is required is to use
another telephone or device, capable of receiving the same radio frequencies.
Like a postcard‘s ability to be read by any third party when in transit, cordless telephone
conversations share similar properties. Any party in range of the cordless telephone base station,
with a similar phone, would be able to overhear the conversation. Most cordless phones are
limited in range, not extending much beyond the boundaries of a normal family home. From
experience, when in an office building, vertical height, as well as the numerous walls and
dividers found in office spaces, further limit the range.
The cordless telephone does not share many properties similar to electronic mail, but the
concerns regarding their use are very similar. The open nature of cordless telephone
conversations spurred debate and fears among legal professions. They were concerned one, that
their conversations could be easily intercepted, and two, that these conversations would result in
waivers of privilege.
The expectation of privacy using this technology in many ways diminished during the
height of these concerns. Attorneys were increasingly aware of the ability to intercept cordless
telephone conversations. Many avoided their use, communicating confidentially through
landlines, or in person, instead. Legislatively, Congress granted the same protections to cordless
phones as landline phones in 1994 through statutory changes of the Federal Wiretap Act.105 It
afforded a reasonable expectation of privacy in conversations, and provided a legal remedy for
intentional interceptions. However, ―it should be noted that some take the position that privacy
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is not assured on a cordless phone since federal law does not apply to mistakes, just intentional
interceptions.‖106
Cellular Telephones
Cellular telephones operate, similarly to cordless phones, by transmitting radio signals to
a base station receiver in a geographic space. The base station then routes the signals to other
base stations, or local telephone companies, to deliver the call. Due to the nature of cellular
radio signals, a receiver capable of receiving radio broadcast signals could be used to intercept
cell phone conversations. Some bar committees urged lawyers to use cordless and cellular
phones with caution. ―Ethics opinions in several states indicated that communications conducted
in this manner might not be considered confidential and might not be covered by the attorneyclient privilege.‖107
The first cellular phones introduced into the market relied on analog radio signals to send
and receive information. Analog radio functions by converting sounds into electrical signals.
The electrical signals are then transmitted via carrier networks to the destination, where the
electrical signals are converted into sound. Because analog radio signals are electrical signals,
being sent and received in public airwaves, many raised concerns that communications could be
easily intercepted, intentionally or by mistake.
Unlike that of analog cell phone technology, digital cellular service transforms sound into
electronic data. The electronic data is made up of binary code, which is transmitted through
carrier radio waves. Digital electronic communication is more difficult to intercept. Although a
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conversation could still be overheard using very sophisticated technology, for the most part,
digital technology increased, to a greater degree, the expectation of privacy.

CHAPTER SEVEN: HOW THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND
ELECTRONIC MAIL COLLIDE
As mentioned earlier, because of the importance of the attorney-client privilege and how
it functions within our legal system, neither attorneys, nor clients, are typically required to
disclose protected, confidential communications to another party outside of the privileged
communication. ―The attorney-client privilege is not absolute, [however,] but is subject to
certain exceptions where the courts have determined that the privilege must give way to some
other, competing policy.‖108 Some of these exceptions include the fiduciary, crime-fraud, ―atissue‖, public policy, and waiver exceptions.109 A fiduciary duty is a ―duty of utmost good faith,
trust, confidence, and candor owed by a fiduciary (such as a lawyer or corporate officer) to the
beneficiary (such as a lawyer‘s client or a shareholder).‖110 The crime-fraud exception is the
―doctrine that neither the attorney-client privilege nor the attorney-work-product privilege
protects attorney-client communications that are in furtherance of a current or planned crime or
fraud.‖111 The ―at-issue‖ waiver is defined as ―an exemption from the attorney-client privilege,
whereby a litigant is considered to have waived the privilege by taking a position that cannot be
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effectively challenged without analyzing privileged information.‖112 The public-policy
exception provides protection for employees who blow the whistle on their employers‘
misconduct.113 Lastly, waiver is ―the voluntary relinquishment or abandonment – express or
implied – of a legal right or advantage.‖114 Once again, this thesis will only focus on the latter
exception, ‗waiver‘ and its role in relation to electronic mail use.
One circumstance, which may require an attorney or client to waive the protections of the
attorney-privilege, arises when the content of their communications is conveyed to a third party.
Disclosure to third parties can take place in many circumstances.115 Such examples include
when a client voluntarily disclosures case facts to another or a lawyer mistakenly provides a
document in discovery containing case strategies. One potential danger of using e-mail is that
disclosure to a third party can arise easily and unknowingly. Mere lack of technological
expertise or a simple typographical mistake might cause disclosure. Clicking the ―reply all‖
button instead of the ―reply‖ button could potentially put protected communications in detriment.
Or, a lawyer may inadvertently add opposing counsel on the recipient list when composing a new
message, whereas the message was intended only for the attorney‘s client. In either scenario, a
lawyer may jeopardize his client‘s case. After careful analysis of relevant case law, it‘s likely
that in either scenario, if the lawyer was responsible for the disclosure, the communication will
remain legally protected by the court. We‘ve already learned that the client is the sole holder of
the privilege. On the other hand, and in an equally likely scenario, if a client was to
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inadvertently disclose a confidential e-mail intended only for his attorney through one of the
mistakes just mentioned, the communication may be admissible at trial.
In a more sophisticated analysis, how does the expectation of privacy play a role in
electronic mail? Except for the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v.
Warshak, no other court has established a legal expectation of privacy in electronic mail. When
looking back to other developing technologies, such as facsimile, the courts were initially
hesitant to grant such protection. Over time, the courts eventually found that there was a
reasonable degree of privacy to be expected, and reminded lawyers in one way or another, that it
was their obligation to protect the confidential communications of their clients. When the
cellular telephone became popular, a similar scenario developed. Lawyers were cautioned in
their use of the technology and advised to use more secure methods of communication when
possible. In order to assert the protections of the attorney-client privilege, there must be a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the communication that it will remain confidential or will
only be disseminated to the intended individuals.
A lesser known, yet equally likely legal complication to the attorney-client privilege and
electronic mail arises from something far less obvious to the common user: targeted
advertisements and the use of third party e-mail clients. Many free consumer e-mail clients, such
as Google‘s ―Gmail‖, use targeted advertisements. They operate through computer software,
which scans and ―reads‖ e-mails to find key words that the software then determines may be
related to advertisements offered by different companies.116 These advertisements appear to the
user by website links located at the top, bottom, or sides of the e-mail client window. Using a
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traditional legal approach, disclosing a privileged communication inadvertently or voluntarily
constitutes as a waiver of the privilege. The obvious question that arises is whether sending email that is subjected to targeted advertising constitutes as a waiver of that communication to a
third party (advertisers)?
The last concern to address regarding the use of electronic mail arises in security. It‘s no
surprise to those familiar with technology, and even to those that aren‘t, that electronic intruders
(commonly referred to as hackers) seek to acquire notoriety, monetary gain, or information
through exploits exposed in computer software. Banks, computers, governments, and the
military have all been subject to hacking attacks, sometimes resulting in devastating
consequences and embarrassing news coverage (see figure 5). Because of e-mail‘s prolific use
and software-based construction, electronic mail has fallen victim to hacking, as well. A
common user‘s electronic mail account may contain bank account information, addresses, phone
numbers, credit card information, and passwords to countless online portals. Considering the
harsh effects these attacks have on common users, attorneys are equally, if not more so, likely to
be ―damaged‖ by a malignant intruder. The question then becomes one of liability. ―If lawyers
have the reason to believe that communications between them and their clients are being
intercepted, regardless of whether the privilege is preserved or not, an attorney may be liable.‖117
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Figure 5: WikiLeaks release of embassy cables was an embarrassing U.S. political dilemma.118

CHAPTER EIGHT: GOVERNMENT-IN-THE-SUNSHINE LAW
One additional aspect to consider in transmitting private information through electronic
mail, especially in regards to attorneys, arises from those employed by municipalities, counties,
or governmental agencies. Florida is one state, among several, which places a high emphasis on
the public‘s right to access information produced by government officials. Even the Florida
Constitution provides for the right of public information:
Every person has the right to inspect or copy any public record made or received
in connection with the official business of any public body, officer, or employee
of the state, or persons acting on their behalf, except with respect to records
118
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exempted pursuant to this section or specifically made confidential by this
Constitution. This section specifically includes the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches of government and each agency or department created
thereunder; counties, municipalities, and districts; and each constitutional officer,
board, and commission, or entity created pursuant to law or this Constitution.119
The tradition of openness began in 1909, when the Florida Legislature voted to create Chapter
119 of the Florida Statutes, which has since become known as the ―Public Records Law.‖120 As
new forms of media have developed, the statute has adapted from including traditional
documents, such as papers and books, to new forms of media, like sound recordings and
computer records. Regardless of the form of media, the general policy of the state, found in
Chapter 119 of Florida Statutes provides, ―It is the policy of this state that all state, county, and
municipal records are open for personal inspection and copying by any person. Providing access
to public records is a duty of each agency.‖121 However, the legislature has provided for several
exemptions from this general rule, and right, as a matter of public policy.
Under Chapter 119.071, Florida Statutes describe general exemptions from the inspection
or copying of public records. One such exemption provides for agency attorneys:
A public record that was prepared by an agency attorney (including an attorney
employed or retained by the agency or employed or retained by another public
officer or agency to protect or represent the interests of the agency having custody
of the record) or prepared at the attorney‘s express direction, that reflects a mental
impression, conclusion, litigation strategy, or legal theory of the attorney or the
agency, and that was prepared exclusively for civil or criminal litigation or for
adversarial administrative proceedings, or that was prepared in anticipation of
imminent civil or criminal litigation or imminent adversarial administrative
proceedings, is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I of the State
Constitution until the conclusion of the litigation or adversarial administrative
proceedings.122
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Under this provision, those records created by agency attorneys which reflect a mental
impression, conclusion, litigation strategy, or legal theory of the attorney or agency are generally
exempt from public records request. Interestingly, however, this statute only provides that these
records are protected until the conclusion of the litigation or adversarial proceedings.
Amy Iennaco, Chief Assistant City Attorney for the City of Orlando, commented
regarding the practices of the City Attorney‘s Office in relation to its document retention
policies, as well as any security measures in place to ensure the confidentiality of e-mail
messages. Currently, the City of Orlando does not utilize separate encryption software to
transmit e-mail messages during the anticipation of litigation. Additionally, Mrs. Iennaco writes
in reference to transmitting confidential information, ―We do not have a specific written policy.
There is a City e-mail policy, but it does not address the specific concern [of transmitting
confidential information].‖
Because of the City of Orlando‘s, City Attorney‘s Office, unique position that all records
prepared in anticipation of litigation are no longer exempt from public records request at the
conclusion of the litigation, Mrs. Iennaco was asked to offer her opinion regarding the use of email disclaimers which state whether a particular message is confidential. She commented,
Although e-mails we receive from outside counsel are often labeled ‗confidential‘
in the subject line, and often contain disclaimers under the signatures, e-mails that
I send usually do not. Because only work done in anticipation of litigation is
exempt, and after the litigation is concluded it becomes public record, I do not
want to give my in-house clients a false sense of security, so they think they can
say whatever they like in their e-mails to me with impunity.
For many attorneys, this idea of purposefully omitting a warning of confidentiality
statement, like was mentioned earlier, may seem counterintuitive. Perhaps, however, this
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method of not instilling a false sense of security in e-mail messages deserves a closer
look, given Mr. Roosenraad‘s comments.

CHAPTER NINE: ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
This thesis has addressed many of the legal and technical aspects of the attorney-client
privilege, electronic mail use, waiver, and other relevant topics, but has yet to discuss the
importance of ethical decision-making in light of these issues.
From a professional sense, placing a strong emphasis on the importance of practicing
ethical behavior improves the credibility of the legal field and restores public trust in the
profession. In the contexts of privileged documents and inadvertent disclosures, ethics continue
to play a very important role. Attorneys are easily able to deceive, intentionally withhold
documents and information, and override the interests of justice by engaging in unethical
practices.
In a digital era, the importance of ethics takes a center role. For example, an attorney
who receives an inadvertently sent e-mail from co-counsel could easily read the e-mail, delete it,
store it, reproduce it, or use it to benefit his client. In fact, it may be only after the message is
read that the attorney realizes the message was intended to be privileged, unless of course the
subject line of the e-mail clearly indicates its confidentiality. What is the accepted ethical
response to a misaddressed facsimile/e-mail, which contains privileged information? Dean
Wigmore would argue that the document, by its receipt alone, is no longer subject to protection
and therefore is free to be used by the receiving party. Other jurisdictions, like the Northern
District of Illinois, argue that when information is clearly intended to remain confidential, it is
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unethical to use the information to the sending party‘s detriment or receiving party‘s benefit.123
Either way, the ethical dilemmas are thorny. There are several responses by the American Bar
Association and The Florida Bar to these predicaments.
Inadvertent Disclosure – Perspective of Florida Bar
In legal practice, documents are exchanged between clients, attorneys, and the courts. On
occasion, some documents are sent inadvertently to the incorrect parties. This can happen with
misdirected e-mails and facsimiles, as well. In Ethics Opinion 93-3, the Professional Ethics
Committee addresses the ethical responsibility of an attorney whom receives inadvertently
disclosed documents. It states ―…that an attorney, upon realizing or reasonably believing that he
or she has received a document or documents that were inadvertently delivered, is ethically
obligated to promptly notify the sender of the attorney‘s receipt of the documents. It is then up
to the sender to take any further action.‖124 As discussed in detail earlier, whether the
inadvertent disclosure will affect the attorney-client privilege depends greatly upon both the
jurisdiction and interpretation of the courts.
The Florida Supreme Court also has adopted an analogous rule governing ethical conduct
of attorneys and their response to receipt of inadvertent documents. Rule 4-4.4(b) notes the
attorney‘s responsibility to notify the sender of a received document when he knows or
reasonably should know it was received in error.125 Notice allows the sender to take protective
measures. The Court does not require any more action aside from notifying the sending party,
however. An attorney may choose to return an original document, delete e-mails, and discard
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faxes, but ultimately, professional judgment and discretion will determine how an individual
attorney will respond.
Deliberate Retrieval of Documents
Ethics Opinion 93-3 pertains directly to documents disclosed inadvertently, but does not
wholly address an attorney‘s ethical duty to respond to documents that have been obtained
wrongfully by the client.126 In a matter brought for review before the Professional Ethics
Committee, an attorney questioned what was the appropriate ethical response in a peculiar
situation.127 In writing the Committee, the attorney describes his client (a wife in a dissolution of
marriage proceeding) retrieving documents from her husband in four, possibly unlawful, ways.
One, she physically removed documents from the husband‘s office before and after the
separation. Two, the wife gained access to the husband‘s office computer and e-mail account,
thereafter printing and accessing financial records and communications sent between the
husband and his attorney. Three, she accessed her husband‘s personal e-mail account where she
continued to download and print more information. Lastly, four, the wife removed documents
from the husband‘s vehicle which were believed to be privileged. This example is relevant to
this thesis for its deliberate misuse of electronic mail. It also is applicable for its insight into
lawyer conduct when dealing with wrongfully obtained information.
Rule 4-4.4(b), in comments, emphasizes that the rule fails to govern documents, which
are given to a lawyer who knows or reasonably should know that the documents were obtained
wrongfully. It only addresses the inadvertent disclosure of documents. While the Professional
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Ethics Committee could not apply Rule 4-4.4(b) to the attorney‘s inquiry above, it found that
other, relevant, rules applied.128
Rule 4-1.6 outlines guidelines for attorneys to follow when handling confidential
information. Generally, confidential information cannot be disclosed without consent of the
client, or if an exception applies. Most importantly, however, it protects confidential
information, whatever the source.129 The Committee writes, ―Thus, under the rule, an attorney
cannot voluntarily reveal any information relating to the representation of a client unless the
client consents or an exception to the rule is applicable.‖130 However, this rule applies indirectly
to the scenario presented. The rule does not, narrowly enough, direct ethical conduct.
Other rules may be useful in finding a solution to this ethical dilemma. Rule 4-1.2(d)
does not permit an attorney to assist a client in behavior which the attorney knows or reasonably
should know is criminal or fraudulent.131 Unauthorized access to data, e-mail accounts, and
vehicle may be considered as criminal, fraudulent, or both. In a criminal proceeding, a court
could demand the production of the ‗stolen‘ documents, but this is a legal finding dependent
upon substantive law and jurisdictional differences, more so than the findings of ethics
committees.
The law is clear, though, in recognizing that attorneys, who receive evidence of a crime,
must produce the evidence to a law enforcement agency. The attorney is not, however, obligated
to disclose the source of the evidence and the prosecution is not able to introduce into trial how
the evidence was acquired. This is demonstrated in Quinones v. State where the court writes,
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―The overwhelming authority in the nation concludes that an attorney may not accept evidence
of a crime unless he or she makes the same available to the prosecutor or the investigating law
enforcement agency.‖132 The finding was echoed too in Anderson v. State, which found that a
lawyer acted responsibly when he surrendered a stolen dictaphone and calculator to the police.133
Rule 4-8.4(c) provides that a lawyer cannot engage in conduct, which involves
dishonesty, or conduct that is considered prejudicial to the administration of justice.134
Additionally, Rule 4-3.4(a) provides that a lawyer must not ―unlawfully obstruct another party‘s
access to evidence or otherwise unlawfully alter, destroy, or conceal a document or other
material that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is relevant to a pending or a
reasonably foreseeable proceeding; nor counsel or assist another person to do any such act.‖135
The Professional Ethics Committee of the Florida Bar refrained from making a definite decision
to assist the petitioning attorney mentioned above. Yet, it can be reasonably inferred that the
conduct the wife prescribed to is not in the interests of justice. Ethically, it will be the discretion
of the attorney whether the documents obtained wrongfully by a client can, or should, be used in
preparation of and during litigation. If the conduct of his client, however, involves conduct that
is criminal in nature, the attorney should discuss the legal ramifications of his client‘s actions
directly, possibly referring the client to the services of a criminal defense attorney. Finally, the
receipt of the documents should be disclosed to the opposing party. This allows the opposing
party to take corrective measures.
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Though the Rules of Professional Conduct fail to adequately address ethical responses in
these situations, an attorney should recognize the provisions that protect client confidentiality
and the overall interests of justice. For electronic mail, which has been provided to an attorney
by a client, the attorney should candidly discuss with his client what means were used to acquire
the information. If criminal in nature, the attorney should refrain from further client
representation and notify the opposing party of the documents or information, which have been
obtained. Furthermore, in the interests of justice and fair trials, an attorney should recognize that
allowing the use of wrongfully acquired information further incentivizes the client to once again
participate in the behavior. Lastly, if the nature of the acquired information is confidential, an
attorney may be sanctioned for disclosing confidential information without consent. Either way,
it is ultimately the attorney‘s responsibility to discourage behavior by his client that does not
abide by the laws or rules of ethical behavior.
Mining for Metadata
Metadata has taken a more recent spotlight in this ethics debate. An electronic document,
such as a word processing document or e-mail, has hidden information, which can be retrieved
by software or other intricate means. This is referred to as ‗metadata‘. The term is defined as
―…information describing the history, tracking, or management of an electronic document.‖136
Once an electronic document has been sent to another party, retrieval of this information could
add additional insight into the case that the distributing party did not intend to disclose. In 2006,
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the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar directed the Professional Ethics Committee to review
the ethical issues surrounding metadata retrieval.137
Metadata can reveal a wide range of information about a document. It can contain
information about the author of the document, revisions made to the document, and comments by
reviewers. Accessing this information could reveal materials the sending party did not intend to
disclose. Or, metadata could include information, which is protected by the attorney-client
privilege.138
The Committee was directed to analyze current Rules of Professional Conduct and make
a determination as to how metadata is affected. As detailed before, an attorney is responsible to
protect confidential client information. Likewise, in the transmission of electronic data, the duty
to maintain confidentiality of information does not vanish. Therefore, the Committee found that
lawyers must take reasonable steps to ensure that documents sent from the lawyer‘s office do not
contain information, which is not intended to be disclosed.
Similarly, an attorney who receives electronic documents is directed to not engage in
behavior that seeks to discover hidden information. If however, information is obtained
inadvertently, in the form of metadata, the attorney must notify the opposing party of the receipt
of the information.
Aside from these aspects of the law, attorneys are to engage in ethical decision-making
on behalf of their clients and the legal profession. Lawyers are quick to adopt practices whereby
costs are minimized and efficiency is maximized. After all, a law firm can greatly reduce its
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operating expenses by investing in electronic mail accounts to send and receive messages in
exchange of frequent mailings, which would ordinarily require postage and paper products.
After a full review of the relevant case law affecting confidential communications sent
using electronic mail, there is no clear answer describing how a judge or court would rule in a
matter contesting whether an e-mail message was protected by the attorney-client privilege. Most
of the current laws affecting this particular field of interest pertain to protecting other forms of
communication. Similar cases may be persuasive, and may be able to be applied to electronic
mail. However, a judge would be required to follow only those cases which are explicitly
precedent.
Legal professionals should be aware of this predicament. Most wish to use the
convenience of electronic mail to its full potential – conveying documents back-and-forth,
communicating with clients extensively through e-mail, and posting information into the
electronic world that is confidential.

CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSION
Electronic mail certainly challenges the traditional notions of communication between
attorneys and their clients. Attorneys can communicate instantly, efficiently, and at a greatly
reduced cost. Though it is one of the most efficient ways of communicating, it is, perhaps, also
one of the most transparent. Mr. Roosenraad‘s discussion on e-mail security presents a strong
argument; concluding a reasonable expectation privacy exists in e-mail messaging may be ill
founded. Moreover, the myriad of ways in which attorneys can cause disclosure of confidential
client information using electronic mail is staggering. Whether it is striking the ―reply all‖
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button, instead of the ―reply‖ button, or unintentionally sending metadata in an attached
document, information is being inadvertently sent. Though many lawyers wish to believe that
communicating electronically is an unbreakably secure medium, one point is clear: disclosure
can and will occur through electronic mail by attorneys.
The question then becomes, what are the repercussions of such disclosure? Though the
American Bar Association has given their ―stamp of approval‖ for electronic mail use, attorneys
should reconsider their technological habits. Consider the wealth of information that is usually
found within an e-mail account. Messages, images, documents, videos, sound recordings, etc.
can all be transmitted and received from one e-mail. Entire case strategies may be discussed, in
alternating messages, between clients and attorneys at a law firm via e-mails. The ease at which
this information can be disclosed should be of alarming concern. Most e-mails, after the
composition of the message, take mere minutes to be sent and received. There‘s little to no time
to rectify an error after a message has been sent. Also, in the daily practice of an attorney, e-mail
messages constitute a large portion of their daily tasks. With responses and messages to judges,
judicial assistants, clients, and counsel, much time is dedicated to communication. It‘s not
overreaching to say that mistakes will be made in the delivery of the e-mail messages. Most
users don‘t have a secondary review system in place for a supervising attorney to review the
message and recipients before a message is sent. In sum, while the technology offers incredible
convenience, it is all too easy for an attorney to violate the attorney-client privilege.
From a strictly legal sense, electronic mail is likely to be granted the same protections as
any other form of communication. Most would agree there is some reasonable expectation of
privacy when transmitting messages using the internet. Florida Courts, likewise, have generally
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found that when a reasonable expectation of privacy is present in a communication, the attorneyclient privilege will attach to that communication. However, it‘s unclear whether the attorneyclient privilege would attach to a communication when an attorney knows a third party is easily
able to intercept his message, or is readily present. As discussed above, the courts have failed to
grant the protection of the attorney-client privilege to conversations when the communication is
known, or the person should have known, the conversation is capable of being overheard.
Although a third party cannot ―overhear‖ an electronic message, one can intercept one,
intentionally or inadvertently. Because of the recent development of this technology, no court
has yet to encounter a situation where case information is disclosed to a third party through
electronic mail. In such a situation, will the court determine that the attorney should have known
his communication reasonably could have been intercepted? Will the court require the attorney
to use a higher level of security, such as encryption software, to further ensure confidentiality?
Or, will the court find that a sufficient expectation of privacy is present in electronic mail
communications to prevent waiver? These are all questions that remain unanswered.
Unfortunately, I cannot provide the answers to what recourse any one particular judge would
take.
From an ethical standpoint, there is cause for concern for any lawyer who uses electronic
mail to communicate case information to a client on a regular basis. Attorneys are charged with
providing their clients open and honest opinions and must take every precaution to ensure
confidentiality. Because of the increasing availability and ease-of-use associated with encryption
technology, attorneys should be looking to implement this protective software into their daily
practice. Though the cost may be cumbersome at first, attorneys will gain greater protection for
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their practice and their clients. No one disputes that the use of encryption technology will likely
end the debate over whether or not electronic mail is a safe means to communicate information.
However, for attorneys who choose to not adopt this protective standard, the burden then rests on
those attorneys to inform their clients of the particular risks associated with communicating
confidential information over the web. Or, attorneys should limit their conversations with clients
over the internet by subject, and use a more well-researched and time-tested form of
communication to communicate sensitive information, instead. Though this poses some
concerns of efficiency and convenience, remember the court isn‘t going to accept ―convenience‖
as an excuse for disclosing confidential communications.
This thesis makes several recommendations for attorneys who wish to utilize electronic
mail in their daily practice. First, all attorneys should adopt some form of encryption
technology. Though Mr. Roosenraad expressed hesitation that encryption technology, alone,
would not eliminate all security threats, it is a much more secure method to transmit information.
Furthermore, it would demonstrate to any court a clear expectation of privacy, on behalf of the
attorney and client, when communicating electronic messages.
Two, when transmitting messages through electronic mail software, disable any ―reply
all‖ buttons. Or, require the software to display a dialogue box to the user, notifying him that the
message is going to be sent to multiple recipients instead of one. Either method would assist in
preventing the inadvertent disclosure of information to unintended parties. Similarly, disabling
threaded conversations, like those found in Google‘s Gmail, would help in preventing the
accidental disclosure of confidential information.
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Three, attorneys should lobby for greater, and more specific, statutory protection when
using electronic mail. A law, which recognizes a right to privacy in electronic messages, would
remedy many of the legal complications electronic mail use is currently plagued by. Or, a more
viable tactic may be to add specific provisions within the Florida Evidence Code attaching the
attorney-client privilege to electronic mail communications. Either way, both methods would
establish a legal basis and foundation to protect confidential communications sent through email.
Four, lawyers should avoid the use of ad-generated electronic mail providers. It‘s
unclear, both from a security perspective and legal perspective, whether targeted advertising
would be considered disclosure to third parties. The information being obtained by these
advertisements may be extremely personal data or indiscriminate usage statistics. In either
scenario, safeguarding against this type of activity would prevent the disclosure of confidential
information. As a solution, lawyers and law firms should purchase commercially available
products that are not funded by advertising revenue.
Five, when transmitting documents by e-mail, attorneys should remove any possible
metadata from their documents. Though ethically this information is not to be actively sought
after by attorneys, for practical reasons, preventing disclosure of this information may save the
attorney‘s client from embarrassing and damaging results. One tangible solution is to adopt
metadata ―scrubbing‖ software. This could prevent the inadvertent disclosure of confidential
client data. Or, lawyers may be able to adopt a more secure document format, known to transmit
and retain less metadata as a standard.
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In summary, this thesis makes three important assertions. First, the use of electronic mail
can result in the legal waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Case law has substantiated that
when a reasonable expectation of privacy does not exist within a communication, or a party
knows his communication can be overheard, then the protections of the attorney-client privilege
do not attach to that communication. Without encryption technology, e-mail is too transparent to
be considered ―private‖ and there are many circumstances when electronic messages are in
danger of being ―overheard.‖ Second, the opinion of the American Bar Association, permitting
the use of electronic mail is invalid; the ABA fails to understand the technology of electronic
mail. More than a decade after the original opinion permitting electronic mail use was issued,
it‘s time for the ABA to reassess their stance on this communication medium and consult more
qualified industry experts regarding its safety. Lastly, unencrypted e-mail should not be used for
practical and legal reasons. E-mail messages, which are not encrypted, equate to the electronic
version of a postcard. There are simply too many situations where either by administrative
oversight, advertisers, interceptors, or inadvertent recipients, third parties are able to receive and
read the content of e-mail messages. ―You‘ve got mail!‖ Now, just make sure to protect it.
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